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The changing nature of labour regulation:
the distinctiveness of the National
Agreement for the Engineering
Construction Industry
Linda Clarke* and Ian Fitzgerald
ABSTRACT
The article addresses the changing nature of labour regulation through analysis of the
National Agreement for the Engineering Construction Industry, originating in 1981.
It shows how multiple spatial regulatory scales, the changing coalitions of actors in-
volved, employer and client engagement and labour agency have been critical to Na-
tional Agreement for the Engineering Construction Industry’s survival.
1 INTRODUCTION
Much is written on the transformation of industrial relations and the regulation of la-
bour under a neoliberal imperative, leading to decentralisation and the erosion of co-
ordinated sectoral bargaining (e.g. Baccaro and Howell, 2011; Marginson, 2015;
OECD, 2019). Despite this, there are policy initiatives in Britain to reconstruct collec-
tive agreements, for which one of the few surviving agreements, the National Agree-
ment for the Engineering Construction Industry (NAECI), serves as a blueprint
(Ewing and Hendy, 2013). The question this raises is how and why has NAECI sur-
vived in the face of the disappearance of multiemployer collective bargaining and
what significance does this have for labour regulation?
In the role accorded to NAECI, the engineering construction industry in the United
Kingdom (UK), characterised by large, often state-sponsored, infrastructure plant
projects, flies against the wind of decentralisation and deregulation. The industry em-
ploys 188,000 workers and its ‘in scope’ activities include design, engineering, pro-
curement, project management, construction, maintenance, repair, replacement,
testing or decommissioning of any chemical, electrical or mechanical apparatus, ma-
chinery or plant, to be used on or installed on a process site, whether in the oil and
gas, renewables, nuclear, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, food and drink, waste
and water sectors [Engineering Construction Industry Training Board (ECITB),
2019a]. As described by Brookes (2012, p. 603), it is
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… a truly global endeavour. Multinational and multicultural projects are the norm encompassing a
wide range of disciplines in addition to civil and structural engineering, such as mechanical engineering,
electrical engineering, control and system engineering, structural and pipe fabricators, contractor ser-
vices and logistics.
Not all clients and contractors choose for their projects to be ‘in scope’, so NAECI
covers only part of the industry. Indeed, official figures for 2017–19 show only about
10,235 workers employed directly under the agreement, although 36,000 were re-
corded in 2008 [Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS), 2009; National Joint Council
for the Engineering Construction Industry (NJCECI), 2019a].
National Agreement for the Engineering Construction Industry registered projects
are nevertheless some of the largest and most prestigious in Britain, including the
£650 million Teeside Biomass project employing over 1,300 site workers, the £350
million Siemens’ Keadby project employing 490 and the £500 million Fawley project
employing 450 (NJCECI, 2019b). These set a standard for the industry with respect to
terms and conditions of employment, including direct employment, working hours,
pay and benefits, pensions, disciplinary and grievance procedures, training and skills
(NJCECI, 2018). Above all, NAECI is founded on the principle of direct employ-
ment, so that sites contrast strongly with those in building and civil engineering,
where labour and wage relations are individualised through extensive subcontracting
and self-employment (representing in 2019 nearly one million in a workforce of 2.3
million), union membership is low, and regulation weak, with only nominal reference
to the National Working Rule Agreement (Clarke et al., 2012; Office for National
Statistics, 2019). Critical to regulatory change in engineering construction has been
the interaction with the wider construction industry and the contradictions inherent
in sustaining a highly complex labour process within a neoliberal capitalist system.
Through the example of NAECI, this article shows how labour regulation has
changed significantly since Flanders’ (1964) postwar notion, referring to the proce-
dural and substantive nature of collective bargaining and the range of actors and
levels where rules are introduced. This change is reflected in debates surrounding
the French Régulation School, faced with the challenges of loss of autonomy of in-
dustrial relations institutions and the need to reconstruct the rapport salarial or wage
relation at the heart of the mode of regulation in the face of internationalisation,
financialisation and sharpening external constraints on national models of develop-
ment (Grahl and Teague, 2000). It is also reflected in literature on the ‘colonisation’
of regulatory space, which emphasises worker agency (Shibata, 2016) and multiple
spatial regulatory scales or the polymorphic nature of regulation (MacKenzie and
Martinez-Lucio, 2014; Pernicka et al., 2016). The colonisation of regulatory space
is no longer confined within national boundaries but has extended in scope and scale
and become more complex. As highlighted by Inversi et al. (2017, p. 294) too, regu-
latory space can be both ‘occupied’ and ‘contested’ over time by actors concerned,
so introducing a historical or polyrhythmic dimension to regulatory change and the
coalition of actors involved.
In this article regulatory change in engineering construction is explored through
key themes—the mode of regulation, regulatory space, labour agency and coalitions
of actors. Given the diversity of the construction sector, account needs also to be
taken of the variegated, uneven nature of capitalist development and the significance
of different product and labour markets (e.g. Brown, 2008; Lane and Wood, 2009;
Peck and Theodore, 2007). The article shows how the regulatory space inhabited by
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the rare example of a surviving collective agreement has been transformed over time
as joint union and employer governance became embedded at different levels—site/
project, sectorally, nationally and transnationally—and how in the process the coali-
tion of actors involved—employers, unions, state and clients—changed, with worker
agency playing a greater role. At the same time, the rationale for NAECI shifted from
productivity bargaining to setting and maintaining labour standards.
1.1 Conceptualising change in labour regulation
While in the 1960s Flanders’ regarded labour regulation as extending from legislation
through to accepted ‘custom and practice’, his focus was predominantly on national
collective agreements. This is evident in his seminal work on Fawley Productivity
Agreements (1964), referring to changes enacted in the 1950s and 1960s at Fawley
Esso Oil Refinery engineering construction project with the introduction of the ‘blue
book’, the same term now applied to NAECI. The original ‘blue book’ centred on
eliminating overtime in favour of a regular working week, regrading related to ‘craft’
status to overcome demarcation disputes and productivity bargaining. Between the
1960s and today, this concept of a sectoral agreement has been demolished. Indeed,
as Visser (2005, p. 24) wrote, ‘the sectoral agreement may survive … but only by de-
nying itself the characteristics that have defined [it]’. The transformation in the nature
of collective agreements has gone together with a change in coordinated bargaining
across Europe, especially since the 2009 crisis, as union and employer association
membership has declined (Gooberman et al., 2019). The governance capacity of sec-
toral agreements has been undermined in favour of those concluded at company level,
posing major challenges for industrial and transnational forms of wage coordination
and denoting a fundamental shift in the mode of regulation (Marginson, 2015, pp.
98–99).
Neoliberalism has precipitated a wider capitalist restructuring of regulation, whose
architecture depends on the dynamics of ‘global’ influences (Hyman, 2001, p. 474). In
the UK, this has entailed a shift to limited individual legal rights, enforced piecemeal
by inspectorates or courts and largely replacing the voluntary system based on collec-
tive social partner rights (Dickens, 2009). The private sector is predominantly
nonunionised, including building and civil engineering, with only limited enterprise
bargaining. In this respect, the regulation of labour relations in engineering construc-
tion represents a disparate mode of regulation, symptomatic of internal diversity
within the construction industry. Disparities in labour regulation can nevertheless co-
exist, representing specific historical legacies, the uneven, ‘variegated’ nature of capi-
talist development, and/or different product markets (Brown, 2008; Jessop, 2011;
Peck and Theodore, 2007). However, disparate forms do not exist in isolation but in-
teract, although occupying different spatial and temporal spheres, reflecting not only
the variegated and polymorphic nature of capitalist development but what Ernst
Bloch termed its ‘polyrhythmic formation’ (Durst, 2002).
Articulation across multiple spatial spheres, both multilevel and multidimensional,
has become critical to the occupation of regulatory space (Dundon et al., 2014).
Union action takes place at different levels—site, sectoral, national, regional and
global—interlinked and articulated in various ways (Pernicka et al., 2016). This is es-
pecially relevant to engineering construction, given its attachment to a specific loca-
tion and, at same time, global nature, where major one-off projects involve
substantial financial risks, usually on the part of the state or region, which might be
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transferred downwards towards individual workers through an extended contractual
chain (Bryan et al., 2017; Fellows and Liu, 2012). As Lillie (2010, p. 687) and Wagner
and Lillie (2013) argue, globalisation of capital and free movement of labour have
created ‘spaces of exception’ so that construction employers can ‘exploit
deterritorialised sovereignty’ through extensive subcontracting and agency labour,
bringing workers across borders to sites while isolating them from local labour stan-
dards. It is in this context of fragmented global governance with dwindling regulatory
control over capital that NAECI plays a role, potentially taking ‘wages out of compe-
tition’, preventing a ‘degrading race to the bottom’ in employment conditions and up-
holding quality standards (Brown, 2008, p. 115).
Within a multiscalar approach, MacKenzie and Lucio (2014) provide a framework
for understanding the dynamics and complexities of regulation today, in contrast to
the predetermined hierarchy of levels assumed in the past:
Regulatory change involves a variety of actors and relations that develop across time and contribute to
an experience of regulation based on alliances, networks and micro-political processes. In reality, regu-
lation is dependent upon a range of processes, and its transfer as a function between actors is not always
clear, unilinear and ‘negotiated’ (189–190).
The suggestion is that a different coalition of actors exists under disparate forms of
labour regulation, echoing Kornelakis (2014), who, in his application of a coalitional
perspective to wage bargaining in the Italian and Greek banking sectors, found that
labour-state coalitions have become critical to institutional survival. Earlier work,
such as Frege and Kelly (2004), emphasises the significance of union strategies in la-
bour regulation, while Shibata (2016) calls for recognition of workers’ agency as cap-
ital restructures. Brook and Purcell (2017, p. 20) also affirm that institutions ‘are
simultaneously reproduced and transformed by the actions of the actors that inhabit
them’. Finally, Inversi et al. (2017, p. 296) argue for an ‘actor-centred approach’ to
regulation, which investigates roles, competences and accountability of the ‘players’
across multilevel pathways in time and space, to better understand the redistribution
of power among actors and labour regulation complexities.
To understand changes in the mode of labour regulation in engineering construc-
tion, therefore, it is necessary to understand the complex articulation between differ-
ent levels, the interplay between the various actors concerned and their changing
coalitions. The considerations here—the nature of regulation within the context of
the variegated, polymorphic and polyrhythmic development of neoliberal capitalism,
the colonisation of regulatory space, deterritorialised sovereignty and the actors in-
volved including the agency of labour—provide a framework for understanding
how collective bargaining remains in place in the global engineering construction
industry.
2 METHODOLOGY
The article applies a case study research design, focused on engineering construction,
to ascertain why and how labour regulation has changed over the past decades
through exploring the introduction, implementation and subsequent development of
NAECI. More specifically, the objectives are to identify changes in (i) the coalition
of actors involved, particularly employers, unions, workers, state and client; (ii) the
implementation of NAECI and (iii) articulation between different levels—site, indus-
try, national and global.
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In order to address the first objective, to ascertain the changing coalition of actors,
data were drawn from 10 oral history interviews conducted between 2010 and 2015
with former Sizewell A construction workers (Wall et al., 2012). Together with an in-
terview with a former National Economic Development Office (NEDO) official, in-
strumental in formulating and negotiating the original NAECI, these provided
detailed and valuable insights into conditions on engineering construction projects
in the 1960s prior to NAECI. To understand more recent developments, union offi-
cials facilitated engagement with the Engineering Construction National Shop Stew-
ards Forum and an Electrical Contracting Industry Sub Committee. This involved
participation in five forum sessions between 2008 and 2017, which allowed for infor-
mal discussion and brief interviews with shop stewards. Shop stewards from engineer-
ing construction sites, including power stations, from across the UK and the national
officers responsible for engineering construction attended these Fora.
Data with regard to meeting the second objective—to understand changes in the
implementation of NAECI—were drawn from 11 interviews conducted between
2007 and 2017 with national Unite union officials, an employer federation, an inde-
pendent auditor and four government agency representatives—including the former
NEDO official. In addition, between 2015 and 2017, approximately 200 documents
were collated, indexed and analysed, including all agreements since 1981, union-spe-
cific communication, large site and supplementary project agreements (SPAs).
To address the third objective, referring to multiscalarity, interviews were con-
ducted at European level with a GMB European Office official and at site level
through visits to Sellafield Nuclear Power Station, where 1,214 employees are cur-
rently covered by NAECI (NJCECI, 2019c). The first visit took place in 2011 and
provided a vivid picture of NAECI implementation at project level, including through
four interviews with contractors, a senior Unite organiser and two officials responsi-
ble for overseeing contractors. To arrange this visit was time-consuming, particularly
passing security checks, and site entry was only allowed to a temporary building, with
interviewees brought in at agreed times. Subsequently, a Sellafield Site Council meet-
ing was observed, and further interviews conducted with a manager and union
representative.
As a result of deploying these varying methods—interviews, visits, observation of
meetings, documentary analysis—it was possible to evaluate the overall impact of
NAECI and changes taking place over a 50-year period in this complex sector.
2.1 Setting up and implementing NAECI
Changes in wage relations and in the institutions supporting these denote shifts in the
mode of regulation (Boyer and Saillard, 2001). Postwar problems associated with
wage relations and the maintenance and development of a skilled workforce
prompted the need for a new system of regulation in engineering construction. Before
NAECI’s introduction in 1981, differences in the wage systems of the building, civil
engineering and engineering construction sectors were not extensive; through the
gradual introduction of NAECI, disparities accentuated. Although stabilised through
the social wage—annual paid holidays, a guaranteed 30 hours working week and an
industry pension and sick pay scheme—the postwar union agreement to payment-by-
results made for increasing ‘havoc’ throughout the construction industry (Clarke
et al., 2012). The bonus, negotiated on site by shop stewards, constituted up to
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100% of the direct wage and a wage drift had set in by the 1970s (Clarke and Janssen,
2016).
A graphic illustration of conditions before NAECI is Sizewell A Nuclear Power
Station, commissioned by UKAtomic Energy Authority and Central Electricity Gen-
erating Board (CEGB) and constructed between 1961 and 1966 by a consortium of
large, mainly UK-based, contractors (Wall et al., 2012). Despite the innovative, dan-
gerous, untried and nontraditional nature of the project, the wage system revolved
around the bonus, negotiated individually by shop stewards for each trade and based
on output, such as the amount of pipework in the case of pipefitters. Echoing
Korczynski (1993), an interviewee, originally employed as a steel erector then NEDO
official, describes industrial relations as frustrating for workers and exploited by
contractors:
Erectors working for one contractor might get much more than for the other, and so the differentials
were always an issue. … Nobody crossed the CEU [Construction Engineering Union] in those days,
so we were in and out just like the rest of them.
The industrial relations system encouraged wide wage differentials, divisions between
site and national levels and many disputes. In 1965, days lost to strikes in engineering
construction were 911 per 1,000 workers, with wages the cause of 41% of stoppages
(Murray and Langford, 2003).
The power that the bonus system gave shop stewards represented a defining feature
of pre-NAECI industrial relations, one persisting subsequently in the building and
civil engineering sectors. As expressed by a former Sizewell steel erector and later
CEU official:
Every major site had senior shop stewards that were little General Secretaries on their sites, many of
whom never played any part in the union, union’s activities, branch life, conferences, or anything like
that. They were just quite happy to be shop stewards on their contracts, where they wielded tremendous
influence with their sites. They set standards, in many regards, for the other major sites in the industry.
(Interview, Greg Douglas)
The numerous disputes over wages and overtime associated with the bonus system
led to government concerns about productivity on the industry’s large state-fi-
nanced infrastructure projects. This was reflected in the 1970 Large Industrial Sites
report of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC), a corporatist
economic planning forum supported by NEDO and bringing together manage-
ment, unions and government to address Britain’s relative economic decline.
NEDC revealed that in the 1960s, when approximately 50,000 workers were
employed on such sites, 70% of whom were skilled, 20% semiskilled and only
10% unskilled, 83% of projects experienced delays (Korczynski, 1997; NEDC,
1970).
The Large Industrial Sites report highlighted one major distinguishing feature of
engineering construction: its high skill level. Engineering construction occupations in-
clude electricians, mechanical fitters, platers and riggers, each requiring formal train-
ing. Before the 1990s, engineering construction training came under the tripartite
Engineering Industry Training Board (EITB) rather than the Construction Industry
Training Board, which covered the rest of construction. Both Boards had a statutory
right to raise levies from firms and equal representation of employers and unionists
plus educationalists. In 1972, however, the EITB moved to a levy exemption as op-
posed to levy grant system, with small firms exempted from paying.
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Following publication of the Large Industrial Sites report and the demise of the
1971 Industrial Relations Act, NEDO set up a Large Sites Action Group. The
CEU, backed by EEPTU (Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing
Union), took up the Group’s proposal for a National Joint Council (NJC) for the en-
gineering construction sector. A booklet entitled ‘What’s wrong on site?’ was circu-
lated in the pay packet of all men on sites. Subsequently, CEU National
Conference passed a resolution for one national agreement for engineering construc-
tion, endorsed by the other unions. Both NEDO and the employers’ associations—
the Oil and Chemical Plant Constructors’ Association (OCPCA), the EEF (Engineer-
ing Employers Federation) and the Site Contractors’ Policy Committee, later (in
1982) the National Engineering Construction Employers’ Association—took this
up. Mass meetings were organised by NEDO around the country, addressed by a con-
tractor, a client and a unionist.
Initially small firms and subcontractors opposed standardisation of wages and
working rules (Korczynski, 1997), and only in 1981 was NAECI or the ‘blue book’
concluded between unions (Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers, EEPTU,
Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths and Structural
Workers, Transport and General Workers’ Union and the National Union of Sheet
Metal Workers, Coppersmiths and Heating and Domestic Engineers) and employers’
associations (EEF, OCPCA, and Thermal Insulation Contractors Association) and
signed at the Trade Union Congress. It has since been periodically updated, the latest
being 2019–20 (NJCECI, 2018). The results of implementing NAECI were soon ap-
parent; by the 1980s, only 15% of projects experienced delays (Korczynski, 1993).
With NAECI’s introduction, intended to centralise wage relations, increase pro-
ductivity and establish a new institutional support structure through a coalition be-
tween contractors, clients, unions and the state (Kornelakis, 2014), the position of
the shop stewards changed fundamentally. In contrast to MacKenzie and Lucio’s
(2014) argument concerning the ‘containment’ of unions through employer colonisa-
tion of regulatory spaces, national union collective organisation was underpinned, as
described by interviewee Greg Douglas when the draft national agreement was pre-
sented to the CEU annual conference in Buxton:
… the unity of purpose that it would bring us, the solidarity, it would bring the whole union under one
agreement; it would give us greater negotiating power;… greater equality to the workers; greater safety
provisions; forums to discuss problems … on joint disciplinary panels. All the things that … were nec-
essary, that we did not have before, were all incorporated into this document. It was a marvellous agree-
ment for the time, and the conference overwhelmingly endorsed it. The only division that opposed it was
the London Division…mainly, they considered… that it would destroy the shop stewards’ movement,
the only real powerhouse that the union had. Our argument was that we could use that shop stewards’
movement at the appropriate annual negotiation times in order to gain benefits on behalf of all the
members and not just the large sites.
Thus, while stigmatisation of labour representatives in the 1960s and 1970s acted as a
precursor to colonisation, leading to union marginalisation and containment in build-
ing and civil engineering and many other industries, engineering construction saw
unions and employers’ associations negotiate the centralised NAECI, although this
‘contained’ workplace representatives and left little space for informal actors.
Through NAECI, the engineering construction industry’s regulatory space was
transformed. The agreement set into motion an architecture of industrial relations
for engineering construction operating today, especially its multiscalarity and
centralisation (Emery, 2015). At national level, in addition to government and client,
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is the NJC of employers and unions, administered by an executive and independent
chair and with wide-ranging powers, including interpreting the agreement and ruling
on any disagreements, categorising work, approving the SPAs required for each pro-
ject and adjudicating if grievances and disputes cannot be resolved locally. The SPA
relates to specific aspects of each site, including areas excluded from the scope of
NAECI coverage and the scope of the Project Joint Council (PJC), which manages
application of NAECI at site level and agrees project performance. At a Sellafield
PJC attended, unionists and employers met separately and then together, discussing
current issues of concern, including health and safety. In 2015, the NJC introduced
a registration system to approve employers to use the NAECI for all ‘in scope’ engi-
neering construction activities, including Category 1 (Major) and 2 (Repair and
Maintenance) projects (NJC, 2014). Clients and contractors can register their work
for NJC approval provided they meet the criteria of compliance with NAECI terms
and conditions.
Finally, an important part of local regulatory arrangements on major projects is an
auditing process to aid project financial stability and ‘industrial harmony’ (Auditor
interview). Following the signing of a SPA on large Category 1 projects, an indepen-
dent auditor, mainly client-funded, is appointed to scrutinise, among other items, in-
dividual wage levels of all workers. This enables the client and PJC to monitor the
compliance of project contractors with NAECI and the SPA. The identification of in-
dividual wage slips only occurs if a discrepancy with NAECI-agreed payments exists.
2.2 A changing coalition of actors
As noted by Brook and Purcell (2017), institutions and industries are dynamic social
phenomena and transformation is through the actors involved. Below the surface
since 1981, the roles of the actors propping up NAECI have changed, with the first
major shift occurring in the early 1990s as the state became more distant as regulator
of industrial relations. Securing the original agreement relied on significant state in-
volvement through the EITB, NEDO, and, as public client, the CEGB. In 1991, the
tripartite EITB was disbanded and the statutory ECITB was set up, with levy-raising
powers but just two union representatives (Department for Education and Skills,
2003). The Thatcher government also increasingly ignored and then abolished NEDO
and privatised the CEGB, so important as client and legitimiser of the NAECI. As a
senior Unite official explained, ‘The CEGB upheld the agreement [and the] employers
adhered to it’. CEGB privatisation led to a burgeoning client and major/managing
contractor role for multinationals, present since the 1970s, but not dominant (Domah
and Pollitt, 2001). The company Électricité de France (EDF), active in power gener-
ation, distribution, design, construction and dismantling, largely owned by the
French state, and the world’s largest producer of electricity, exemplifies the current
situation.
On the employers’ side, by the early 1990s, OCPCA joined with National Engineer-
ing Construction Employers’ Association to form the Engineering Construction In-
dustry Association (ECIA) and EEF abandoned multiemployer for single-employer
bargaining and ‘the management prerogative’ (Purcell, 1991), ceasing its previously
significant role in maintaining the agreement. With multinational dominance, con-
tractual relations between client and contractor became less direct and finance and
project management decision-making moved onto a global level (BIS, 2009; Bryan
et al., 2017). Today ECIA, with a membership of 300 predominantly global
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companies and a very different institution from the traditional employer association
representing nationally based companies, is the key employer body to safeguard
NAECI. The largest UK construction company remaining is Balfour Beatty, while
smaller enterprises tender for minor contracts. This increasing globalisation of clients,
companies and the main employer association, together with the liberalisation of en-
ergy, signifies the entry of new actors and regulatory boundary changes (MacKenzie
and Lucio, 2014).
A significant change in the unions also occurred in the early 1990s, especially fol-
lowing the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers and EEPTU merger to
form the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union. Today just two trade
unions (Unite and GMB) are partners in the NJC, together with ECIA and two
other employers’ associations. As guardians of workplace-negotiated regulation,
unions have sought to enforce regulation on multiple scales and not been ‘out
manoeuvred’ by new management strategies or marginalised and contained by gov-
ernment efforts. This is evident from the strategic engagement of the engineering
construction sector shop stewards, representing a further response to mounting chal-
lenges from 2000 onwards and a significant change in the regulatory space NAECI
inhabits:
… in 1999 the old brigade … there since 1981 … would live too much in the past. They would do the
negotiations, did not involve the shop stewards … and we just got a [wage notification] telex around
Christmas… when the men came back.… Since 2003 we developed the [national] shop stewards’ forum
that’s been the life-blood of engagement with the workforce and the trade union activists. (Interview:
Unite National Officer)
The original intention of the centralised NAECI was to contain a local shop stewards’
movement organised through ‘cabin’ and worker militancy on sites (Korczynski,
1993). But although NAECI succeeded in institutionalising local negotiation, mainly
through PJCs, this accentuated a detachment between the membership and the na-
tional union. New national officials instigated a more ‘structured’ approach to mem-
bership engagement, central to which was setting up the National Shop Stewards
Forum in 2003, which is now critical to maintaining the agreement (Unite National
Officer). The Forum convenes over two days three times per year, involves both
GMB and Unite members and gives a strong national framework to local engage-
ment with shop stewards and members as well as encouraging informal contact be-
tween meetings. As explained by the Unite National Officer in 2017, the purpose
was to
… give more accountability … involving stewards in the decision-making and also in the pay negotia-
tions This year there were two full-time officials and six lay shop stewards who will lead the
negotiations.
Outside official channels, union members have also succeeded in coordinating to
maintain NAECI rights through ‘unofficial’ action (Gall, 2012).
Thus, while in the first years of the new millennium, the edifice had appeared shaky,
a strong architectural prop was provided by the union leadership. The new coalition
of actors in place—global employers and clients, national unions and shop stewards
—often working closely with the state has changed the colonisation of regulatory
space and given greater prominence to worker agency. It has sought to take wages
out of competition and protect the industry from the encroachment of conditions
prevalent elsewhere.
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2.3 The changing mode of regulation
Pertinent to understanding this actor-centred change in engineering construction are
the accusations raised between 1998 and 2008 that engineering construction produc-
tivity lagged behind the US Gulf Coast by 11% and mainland Europe by 5% because
of inadequate schedules, poor project controls and excessive engineering and con-
struction overlaps (Independent Project Analysis, 2009). Reports highlighted poor
employment practices and inadequate training associated with reduced levels of pro-
ductivity, including aspects common to the rest of construction: casual and indirect
employment; low skill levels requiring considerable supervision; poor site manage-
ment and the NJC’s narrow role (ECITB, 2005). It was therefore recommended that
the training levy apply to all UK NAECI-based companies, apprentice numbers be
doubled through government contributions, training given to line management, and
NAECI fully implemented (BIS, 2009).
These recommendations are significant in attributing low productivity to a failure
to maintain standards in terms of employment conditions and skills, and not, as ear-
lier perceived (Ahlstrand, 1990) directly to low output levels per worker. In this re-
spect, NAECI was seen as key to improving and upholding standards even though
the weakened skill base is attributable to the ineffectiveness of the employer-based
VET system under ECITB rather than to NAECI implementation. Engineering con-
struction employment has been estimated to expand by about 33,000 jobs between
2016 and 2026 (ECITB, 2017). Yet in a survey of 829 engineering construction com-
panies, employing 147,000 workers, 81% complained of ‘lack of knowledge, experi-
ence and practical skills in applicants’ (ECITB, 2019a, p. 7). Much of the existing
workforce requires further training and apprentice starts were just 641 in 2018
(ECITB, 2019b). The reality in one of the most dangerous, technologically demand-
ing and infrastructure-significant industries has therefore been decreasing levels of
VET, severe skill shortages and greater reliance on European-wide subcontracting
and posted workers.
Challenges to the agreement have intensified since 2000, wrought by extensive and
global subcontracting and involving increased use of foreign posted workers, whether
employed by contractors or subcontractors, coming through an agency or self-
employed (Fitzgerald et al., 2012). The Posted Workers Directive (PWD; 96/71/
EC) regulating the movement of labour (posting) across the European Union details
only ‘minimum’ provisions to protect workers. An implied intention of the PWD was
to ensure equal treatment and nondiscrimination, with social partners in different
countries comparing home and host conditions and applying the most beneficial, in
a process requiring employer agreement and a favourable policy framework
(Cremers, 2010). The accession of the Central and East European (A8) countries in
2004 and pervasive liberalisation pressures (Hauptmeier, 2011) have challenged pre-
vailing policy environments, provoking ‘half-hearted’ employer and state responses
in construction (Lillie and Greer, 2007, p. 553).
Given this situation, union strategies (Frege and Kelly, 2004) and worker agency
(Shibata, 2016) assumed ever more importance and in 2009 became ‘globally’ evident
through the oft-quoted “British jobs for British workers” slogan. In 2004–05, the
unions highlighted challenges posed by the posting of workers and disputes arose,
for instance at Cottam (Lincolnshire) where unionists struck for five weeks in support
of a Hungarian colleague (National Engineering Construction Committee, 2004,
2005; Unite interview). As detailed by Gall (2012), in 2009, disputes occurred at the
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Lindsey oil refinery and at Staythorpe and Isle of Grain power stations, where two
Spanish subcontractors (Montpressa and non-ECIA member FMM) refused to con-
sider employing local UK-based labour. On these and other sites, UK-based labour
was by-passed, leading Unite to call on government to insist companies applying
for contracts on public infrastructure projects sign up to Corporate Social Responsi-
bility agreements committing to fair access for local labour (Barnard, 2009). The
disputes:
…highlighted the problems and frustrations with regard to redundancies, as the recession was beginning
to have an impact. People felt that they were being discriminated against as employers would not em-
ploy local labour. [This is about] … people being bought in from cheaper wage countries, its wage
dumping. (Interview, Unite National Officer)
At Ferrybridge Multifuel 1, the Swiss general contractor Hitachi Zosen Inova used
foreign subcontractors, despite the express intention to subcontract to local and UK
companies wherever possible. One Croatian subcontractor, when challenged by
GMB and Unite for paying its workforce below NAECI rates, was forced to ‘top
up’ wages paid, although after project completion the company reclaimed this ‘top
up’ from posted workers. In 2015, large numbers of construction workers protested
outside biomass power stations. At one, the global contractor Babcock & Wilcox
Vølund refused to include the project under NAECI and subsequently subcontracted
the boiler construction to the same Croatian firm, with a tender based on Croatian
wage levels, well below NAECI rates. This exemplifies Lillie’s (2010) variegated sov-
ereignty and the problem of projects constructed outside the national agreement. In
2011 and 2012, GMB and Unite unionists demonstrated against non-NAECI terms
and conditions offered to workers at the Exxon Mobil plant at Fawley. Hinkley Point
nuclear power station, too, has a separate agreement, one echoing NAECI and also
embracing civil engineering (EDF, 2013a, 2013b). All these incidents contributed to
the requirement in 2015 that projects be registered in order to ensure standards are
maintained in full because:
Unscrupulous Clients and Contractors have been pirating the NAECI without the consent of the NJC
which has resulted in a cheaper deal for them as they have been picking and choosing which terms to
make available to their employees and have not been applying all of the NAECI terms and conditions.
(NJCECI, 2019d)
At forum meetings attended, persistent complaints were made about low training
levels, the introduction of cheap labour and lack of equality of opportunity for UK
workers. While disputes have strengthened workforce solidarity, one reason for them
has been weaker NAECI implementation, resulting in the encroachment of employ-
ment practices from the rest of construction and epitomising the polyrhythmic nature
of development.
3 MULTISCALARITY
The engineering construction disputes exemplify the importance of multiscalar anal-
ysis as the global sharply meets the local and disputes, negotiations and changes to
NAECI have ensued. At different levels, the unions have sought through various
means to maintain compliance and enforcement, such as by pursuing firmer linkages
with unions elsewhere in Europe, including Confédération Générale du Travail in
France and Croatian and Danish unions. They have campaigned to convince national
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government that the PWD account for sector-prevailing employment conditions, and,
where appropriate, collective agreements (Novitz, 2010). Campaigning documents
have been published (e.g. National Engineering Construction Committee, 2004,
2005; Unite, 2009) and leaflets, posters, sticker ‘resources’ and website produced, ded-
icated to revising the Directive following European Court of Justice judgements. In
accordance with MacKenzie and Lucio’s (2014) evaluation of the changing state role,
UK government’s response has been ‘hands off’, as was evident during an interview
with a Department of Business, Innovation and Skills policy officer responsible for
posted workers, who explained that the Liaison Office she administered was
… not an inspectorate or anything else like that; all we are really is a mailbox so if other countries want
to find out about companies or people posted to their countries from the UK they can. We can give
them very limited bits of information.
Since Lindsey, direct reference to non-UK-based workers is included in NAECI:
The non-UK contractor will be made aware of the content of the SPA and comply with its contents…
have the knowledge and capability to correctly run a NAECI payroll (and) responsibility to comply
with NAECI with particular attention to Audit. (NJCECI, 2015)
Although auditing has been in place on large projects since the early 1980s, as the
workforce has become increasingly mobile and international, with teams of foreign
posted workers arriving on site, it has become critical as a linkage between local, sec-
toral and global levels (Lillie, 2011; Pernicka et al., 2016).
Although tripartite national responses have diminished, union action to enforce na-
tional regulation and collectively agreed terms and conditions has increased, enhanc-
ing solidarity and interlinking national, regional and local levels through the National
Shop Stewards Forum. However, there are ongoing challenges symbolised in Euro-
pean Court of Justice PWD rulings, which exemplify the ‘spaces of exception’ that
can undermine existing national regulation (Lillie, 2010, 2011; Wagner and Lillie,
2013). While acknowledging the legitimacy of union action, the rulings require that
this is proportionate to the case in hand, so marginalising the right of unions to under-
take industrial action and limiting national legal support (Viking Case C-438/05 and
Laval Case C-341/05; Luxembourg C-319/06 and Rüffert C-346/06). Subsequent
European Commission proposals to reconfigure the PWD have hardly met construc-
tion union concerns across Europe that free movement should not mean superseding
national social rights (European Trade Union Institute, 2016).
At site level, one response to productivity challenges has been far-reaching changes
to the labour process. As this has become more complex, requiring greater know-how,
abstract competences, and coordination between different occupations, integrated
teamworking has become prominent rather than the trade-based or craft-based divi-
sions and hierarchies that characterised the engineering construction labour process
when NAECI was first introduced (Clarke et al., 2013; Young, 1986). The Major Pro-
jects Agreement Forum for the mechanical and electrical sectors officially endorsed
integrated teamworking in 2003 (Joint Industry Board, 2003, p. 7), stipulating ‘oper-
ational flexibility within the competence level of each Team Member’. This is echoed
in the NAECI-inspired Common Framework Agreement for Hinkley Point Nuclear
Power Station, where integrated teamworking is seen as facilitating ‘highly productive
working’ (EDF, 2013a, p. 4), the aim being ‘to achieve and sustain high standards’
(EDF, 2013b, p. 22). While not yet forming a common approach to major project
construction, with discrete task working enforced by subcontracting, it does
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exemplify how NAECI and its union-employer custodians have negotiated their way
to new ways of working.
A further adjustment at project level has been greater use of SPAs, ratified by the
NJC, overseen by the PJC and facilitating workplace (project) flexibility while main-
taining union regulation. SPAs are not to be confused with company level agreements
(Marginson, 2015), as they include any incentive bonuses and unions closely regulate
individual performance enhancement. Indeed, multinational clients have had little
success in their ongoing attempts to reframe regulatory boundaries or abandon
NAECI by trying to enact alternative procedures linked to performance on particular
projects.
These challenges—the globalisation of the labour force, posting disputes and poor
NAECI implementation, productivity and VET—and responses to them—the accep-
tance of integrated teamworking, increased use of SPAs for workplace flexibility and
compliance required of non-UK contractors—symbolise the readjustment of regula-
tory space at different levels. The agreement has evolved over the years and met suc-
cessive boundary challenges and yet remains a centralised agreement, negotiated
between unions and employers, with controls over wage rates, bonuses and projects
themselves through SPDs, PJCs and the auditing process. Considerable challenges re-
main, including the weakness of the VET system, meeting the greater qualification
and skill requirements demanded by a transforming labour process, integrated
teamworking, widespread subcontracting, the use of agency labour and the
financialisation of construction companies.
4 CONCLUSIONS
The origins, implementation and subsequent modifications to NAECI reflect changes
in the mode of regulation and in the production and labour processes. The pillars of
the industrial relations edifice have moved and been materially transformed, bound-
aries shifted, and the architecture assumed a new shape. At the same time, the agree-
ment has been challenged, including through changing contractual relations, global
labour mobility, productivity concerns, VET and skill weaknesses.
One of the most important reasons for the agreement’s survival is its adaptability
through the changing coalition of the actors involved, supporting the relevance of
Kornelakis’ (2014) coalitionist approach. Changes in the roles of global, national, re-
gional and local parties illustrate the dynamic and polymorphic character of regula-
tory space. While there exist similarities with the building and civil engineering
sectors, including the use of agency labour and the employer-led VET system, differ-
ences in stakeholder roles are considerable. Without, for instance, the agency of la-
bour and supportive union strategies, it is difficult to imagine how NAECI might
have survived the dramatic disputes of 2009. In this respect, the case confirms
Shibata’s (2016) emphasis on the importance of worker agency and Frege and Kelly’s
(2004) on the significance of union strategies. Worker agency has been critical to ad-
dressing challenges through union campaigning, adjustments to the centralised char-
acter of the agreement, the establishment of a National Shops Stewards Forum, the
PJCs covering all major sites and the recognition of new ways of working.
Also important for NAECI’s survival is the continued support of employers and
clients, attributable in large part to the high risk, complex, and high-quality standards
associated with the product, necessitating coordination of diverse organisations and
drawing on a wide range of expertise (Fellows and Liu, 2012). The rationale for the
70 Linda Clarke and Ian Fitzgerald
© 2020 The Authors. Industrial Relations Journal published by Brian Towers (BRITOW) and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
agreement has shifted from improving output, through for instance wage incentives
and productivity bargaining, to maintaining labour standards. NAECI serves as an
important instrument of ‘colonisation’, setting industry boundaries or ‘scope’ and up-
holding standards and, in so doing, taking the industry’s products ‘out of competi-
tion’ (Brown et al., 2008). As a result, Brexit may have little significant impact on
NAECI implementation. A weak spot nevertheless remains its inability to regulate
the reproduction of the highly qualified labour force employed, which would require
a transformation of the VET system through substantial state support.
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